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ABSTRACT 
 
It was concluded in the literature that military is merely a symptom of 
underlying political difficulties, a neutral force, which mechanically moves 
into the political area when a vacuum is created. Armed forces took control 
over the political management only in those economies where magnitude of 
military power was greater in relation with the size of economy: a higher 
defense expenditure to GDP ratio lead the control of political management 
by armed forces. 
 
I: Evaluation of Coupology 
The study of the causes of military rule has become an important topic in the 
academic research and literature during the last forty years. Academic 
research in this field developed a new science – Coupology – for study of the 
rule, consequences and causes of military regimes in scientific manners. 
Academic scholars have different views about military take over. Guillermo 
O'Donnell (1978) has argued that large-scale heavy industrialization and 
economic development may, in fact, be associated with military take-over, 
rather than the emerging of representative institutions. Scholars such as 
Talcott Parsons, Gabriel Almond and David Easton held that military activity 
should be understood as the result of basic societal imbalances, which could 
only be corrected by changes in the underlying system (McAlister: 1966).  
 
The literature on military intervention assumes that the basic explanatory 
variables, the military and the domestic political process, are located within 
the boundaries of national societies. Such a formulation leaves little room for 
a conception of the considerable importance to the role of outside elements. 
The military is assumed to be neutral, unless provoked by a breakdown in 
societal equilibrium.  
 
According to Huntington (1968), military intervention in politics, or political 
disorder, is the direct result of the inability of a country's political institutions 
to cope with the rising demands motivated by political participation resulting 
from economic and social change. This view assumed that the military is 
merely a symptom of underlying political difficulties, a neutral force, which 
mechanically moves into the political area when a vacuum is created. In 
Huntington’s view, "the institutions created in Pakistan after 1958 were in 
large part the result of conscious political planning”. 
 
It was observed that military never intervened in the political management if 
safety valve was available in other form like power to dissolve the 
government. For instance, in Pakistan military never intervened in the 
political process and management in presence of the presidential power to 
dissolve the government in case of illegal and unconstitutional activities. 
Armed forces had intervened in Turkey for three times. They changed the 
constitution and regularized the system. Now there is no need of a military 
intervention and the system is running smoothly, because, now a safety valve 
and control mechanism is available in the system. 
 
II: Theoretical Progress 
The fact that the armed forces are powerful political factors with interests and 
stakes of their own, operating either individually, or in demonstration with 
other actors in society. Sometimes. Forces work even at cross purposes with 
each other. According to Geoffrey Barraclough (1985), the armed forces are 
the military arm of the civilian government. However, in most of the world 
and for most of the World's history, it would be nearer the truth to say that 
the government was the civilian arm of the military (Valenzuela: 1985). Finer 
(1982) addressed two important questions: first, what are the conditions that 
lead to surrender; and second, what are those that lead the military to 
intervene again at a subsequent date? Finer (1982) analyzed military 
intervention in terms of the interplay of two factors: the disposition of the 
military towards intervention and the social conditions, which invite or, 
conversely, prohibit military intervention. This obviously, permits a two-by-
two matrix of the Yes-Yes, No-No, Yes-No, No-Yes variety, and Finer 
proceeded by filling the cells of this matrix with the various components of 
the two summary variables, 'dispositions' and 'societal conditions', what 
applies to military intervention into politics can be 'played-back' to explicate 
its extrusion. Sundhausen (1988) pointed out and derived the matrix of the 
factors of the political rule of military. 
 
Figure: I 
Cofactor of the Military Rule 
 Disposition Societal Conditions 
Motivations 1. Belief in civilian 
supremacy 
2. Threat to cohesiveness 
3. Lack of self-confidence 
1. Internal challenges 
2. External factors 
Necessary 
Conditions 
1. Internal consensus to 
withdraw 
2. Adequate protection of 
corporate interests 
Civilian organization to 
hand over. 
 
Geo-security is considered as a part of national security. Economic, political 
and social securities are parts of the national security. Moreover, a country 
can be automatically collapsed without any military action if it looses the 
ideology. It is important that military and paramilitary forces and the 
intelligence agencies work for entire national security. Historical evidences 
on military surrenders confirm the validity of hypothesis that power of 
militancy is not sufficient without consideration of political, economic and 
social securities. Fall of the former Soviet Union, East Germany, Yugoslavia, 
and separation of East Pakistan form its West wing, down fall of Roman and 
Mughal empires accepted this hypothesis. Now it is not a secret that opponent 
forces weaken the economic, political and social infrastructures before a 
militancy action. So, armed forces cannot keep themselves isolate with the 
other parts of national security.  
 
It is also a common observation that armed forces took control over the 
political management only in those economies where magnitude of military 
power was greater in relation with the size of economy: a higher defense 
expenditure to GDP ratio lead the control of political management by armed 
forces.  The control over government by armed forces in Pakisatn, 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Korea, Vietnam, Philippines and 
Sudan confirm this corollary. It has been happening regardless of the 
continent, religion, economic ideology and political system of the countries. 
A higher ‘Defense expenditure to GDP ratio is the only common factor in all 
those countries where military forces controlled over the government.   
 
Figure: II 
Political Governance in South Asia 
Constitutional 
Amendments 
Country Military Rule 
as a % of 
independent 
existence 
Present 
Constitution 
adopted 
No. of 
Amendments 
Cabinet 
size as a % 
of national 
assembly 
(Latest) 
Bangladesh 60 1972/ 86 15 14 
India 00 1950 78 07 
Pakistan 50 1973/85 14 11 
Sri Lanka 00 1978 16 13 
 
Normally no one objects to the Calling in of the armed forces to the help of 
civilian authority in emergencies like earthquakes, floods, cyclone, and 
widespread civil disturbance. Even in developed countries where civilian 
state apparatus is better organized and experienced and more efficient armed 
forces are called out to help in emergencies to handle promptly and 
efficiently enough. The difference of opinions is due to transfer of the 
political governance from democratic institutions to the armed forces. This 
difference is based on the assumption that democracy is the only desirable 
system of government.  
 
In fact, the apprehension from military rule is a creation of the cold war era, 
when communism was on its peak. In a large number of cases communism 
have been imposed through military revolution. This was the reason that 
democracy has been emphasized to provoke the forceful implementation of 
left wings' thought. Democracy has been being considered a desirable system 
to oppose the communism. While, democracy is not important itself, it is 
important because of human welfare, economic development, personal 
freedom and the sense of protection. If a system (either democracy or military 
rule) provides those desirable properties, it would be acceptable by the 
peoples. If a government is promoting investment activities, providing 
economic welfare, protecting personal freedom, honoring intellectual 
property rights, providing good governance, it would be recognized by the 
society. 
 
The armed forces usually enter politics when civilian political groups fail to 
legitimize themselves. When civilian institutions lack legitimacy, electoral 
support, and effective executive power, the militarization of civil affairs often 
occurs. The research in Defense Economics in the international context 
shows that there is no clear relation between political administration by the 
military and defense expenditure (West: 1992). It has also been observed that 
the political administration by the military has no harm for investment and 
stock market. Investment is directly concerned with economic and political 
stability. Military administration may provide a long-term stability. It is being 
emphasized in the economic and political debates in all over the world that 
democracy is one of the major factors of economic development. But, the 
history of democracy in Pakistan shows a dark picture of the economic 
development. The negative correlation between the democracy and economic 
development in the context of Pakistan implies that at least one of the 
following two corollaries should be accepted: 
1) There is no significant relation between the democracy and 
economic development; or 
2) Democracy has not been implemented in its real sprit. 
 
III: Governance by Military in Pakistan 
In Pakistan, rule by the military establishment has prevailed for almost half of 
the history. So, far as the present change in Pakistan is concerned, it matches 
the theoretical background of military interventions. Extraordinary steps are 
required to control extraordinary evils. In the light of the above mentioned 
scholarly contributions it can be mentioned that the change is a logical 
consequence of the political and social conditions in the country. It is quite 
logical and based on historical tends. The application of the "Theory of 
Necessity" is considered a valid option if a significant majority of the people 
accept it. According to a survey, 75 percent Pakistani favored the dismissal of 
Nawaz government.  
 
Majority of the people believes that law and order situation will improve, but 
they do not hope that economic conditions would improve. There are two 
major causes behind this apprehension: (1) Peoples give importance to the 
opinions, evaluations and economic assistance by the international donor 
agencies. Their importance has been created in the people's minds, in fact 
more than 90 percent of the National Income of Pakistan depends on 
domestic resources; (2) In past, peoples have been being assured that the 
economy would be improved, but it has been further deteriorated. 
 
Social, political and judicial reforms are considered the catalyst for the 
economic development. It is important to note that an extreme black picture 
was observed on those catalytic fronts before the military takeover in 1999. 
More than seven lakh cases were pending in the courts. About 200 peoples 
had been killed in sectarian violence in a year. (Those were not Hindu-
Muslim or Christian-Muslim violence). Thirty-six prisoners were died in the 
police custody during a year. Since 1985, five elections had been conducted 
and six assemblies were dissolved before the military takeover. 
 
The laws legislated through the presidential ordinances were 300 percent of 
the laws enacted after the proceedings in the parliaments. While in a real 
democratic system parliament is the only law making body. Various standing 
committees on parliament are formed to scrutinize the bills for law making. 
The committees are seldom allowed to properly scrutinize bills, as they are 
debated in the parliament. Committee members themselves can be ill-
qualified as they are selected on the basis of their standing in the party, 
factional backing, and personal links with the party leader and not on the 
basis of their educational background, professional experience, commitment 
to democratic principles or technocratic expertise. 
  
Bureaucrats are the other major element of the political system of Pakistan. In 
fact, they should be policy executors and not policy makers. But, in Pakistan 
the extent of bureaucratic involvement in politics is exceptionally high. For 
instance in Pakistan, eight heads of state, four of which were generals and 
four senior bureaucrats, had dismissed eleven Prime Ministers. 
 
Figure: III 
Cabinets’ Structure in Pakistan 
As a % of cabinet size Period 
Feudal Businessmen 
1985-88 44 10 
1988-90 34 04 
1990-93 32 20 
1993-96 45 07 
1997-99 32 20 
2002-03 16 18 
Figure: IV 
Level of education of the parliamentarians (%) 
Pakistan Level of Education India 
1998 2003 
Metric or Less than 16 21 00 
Bachelor Degree 42 35 74 
Master Degree 27 24 25 
Doctoral Degree 06 00 01 
 
The Mahbub-ul-Haq Human Development Centre (2000) conducted a survey. 
According to the survey results 63 percent peoples in Pakistan do not have 
faith in the present political system; 64 percent do not think that legal system 
can protect their rights. 88 percent believe that political leaders are corrupt; 
33 percent are compelled to give a bribe. 
 
It is interesting to note that most of the macroeconomic variables performed 
better during the Martial law regimes in Pakistan than the democratic 
governments. Armed forces have been performing such diversified duties as 
the running of the terminally sick WAPDA, the discovering of ghost schools, 
the maintenance of public order and the dispensing of justice, the overseeing 
of water and sewerage system and the supply of electricity. 
 
Figure: V 
What do People think about system? 
India Pakistan Survey Question / Responses 
Yes No Yes No 
Do you have faith in the political system of your 
country? 
65 29 37 63 
Is the legal framework just and protective of 
people's rights? 
46 36 30 64 
Have you ever given a bribe? 15 81 33 67 
Do you think that your political leaders are 
corrupt?  
65 17 88 03 
Do you feel that the political leaders have become 
even more corrupt in the past five years? 
80 14 88 09 
Do you think that judges are corrupt? 30 35 67 13 
Do you think that police officers are corrupt? 67 16 94 03 
Source: The Mahbub-ul-Haq Human Development Centre
 
 
Figure: VI 
Comparison of Economic Performance 
Macroeconomic 
Indicators 
Bhutto 
(72-77) 
Zia 
(77-85) 
Junejo 
(85-88) 
Benazir 
(88-90) 
Nawaz 
(90-93) 
Benazir 
(93-96) 
Nawaz 
(93-99) 
Musharaf 
(00-03) 
GDP Growth (%) 4.9 6.6 6.2 4.7 5.2 5.0 3.4 6.1
Inflation (%) 18.0 8.3 4.8 8.2 10.7 11.7 10.1 5.3
As % of GDP 
Investment 16.0 18.1 18.6 18.8 19.9 18.8 17.3 16.3
Budget Deficit 7.3 6.8 8.3 7.0 8.1 5.9 5.8 3.3
External Debt 47.4 33.6 34.9 36.6 35.5 37.6 39.7 35.0
Domestic Debt 22.8 26.1 41.7 43.6 44.2 43.0 41.3 35.0
National Debt 70.2 59.7 76.5 80.2 79.7 80.6 81.0 70.0
Current A/C Balance -6.4 -4.1 -3.5 -4.8 -4.7 -5.0 -4.8 +1.4
Reserves 
(No. of Weeks) 
13.2 10.6 6.8 4.5 4.2 12.2 5.2 52
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